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THE CHAOS MACHINE: THE WTO IN A SOCIAL ENTROPY MODEL 
OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 
 
 
DAVID COLLINS 
 
ABSTRACT:  This article applies social entropy theory to international trade law, suggesting 
that observed shifts in world trading system towards disorder are the consequence of 
insufficient “energy” inputs in the form of an effective, centralized legal framework.  In 
support of this claim, the article draws attention to recognized and substantive deficiencies in 
the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’).  These include trade round negotiation impasse, the 
rise of bilateralism, indeterminacy in the treaty texts and inadequate enforcement procedures.  
These problems represent increasing disorganization, or entropy, in the world trading system, 
a phenomenon characterized most notably by growing income inequality between states and 
failure to achieve progress in further trade liberalization.  While this article does not propose 
either specific predictions or practical solutions to the dilemma of social entropy in the world 
trading system, it does suggest that a more robust, authoritative and trade-focused WTO is 
essential to counter the entropic tendencies within the supra-national trading system. This 
should help to ensure future growth and achieve the fuller distribution of economic prosperity 
through global trade.  
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: SOCIAL ENTROPY THEORY AND WORLD TRADE LAW 
The study of international trade law can be enriched through the application of descriptive 
and prescriptive models derived from the sciences and social sciences.  In this regard, the 
second law of thermodynamics states that all physical processes are irreversible (meaning 
one-directional) because some energy is always spent or dissipated as heat.  The amount of 
dissipated energy in a system is referred to as entropy.  At equilibrium, the point of maximum 
entropy, a system has become totally disorganized.  Entropy therefore measures the 
progression of relatively closed systems, meaning those with no exogenous inputs of energy, 
towards equilibrium which is characterized by a state of random disorder.  Stable systems can 
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maintain organization or order, therefore, only by importing sufficient energy from outside.  
In the social sciences of sociology and anthropology social entropy theory states that complex 
modern societies are themselves systems that have a number of distinct features which 
operate to ensure that entropy levels remain below the maximum or equilibrium, meaning 
that they remain organized and do not devolve into chaos or anarchy.    
By importing the principles of physics, social entropy can be described as a scientific 
theory of society.   As a scientific theory, social entropy can be applied to explain more fully 
actual phenomena, namely specific social systems.  It can also be tested by reference to 
various indicia of disorder that emerge over time.  Social entropy theory is therefore a 
descriptive model for understanding the phenomenon in which social systems and the 
institutions within them tend towards a state of disorganization.1  Inasmuch as any social 
system is deprived of energy to counter this tendency towards entropy, social entropy theory 
is also a predictive model because it anticipates that social systems that lack sufficient 
energy, however this may be measured, will ultimately degenerate into chaos.  This may be 
characterized by such manifestations as lawlessness, poverty, inequality, and lower life 
expectancy. 
 Based on the above theoretical constructs, this article will propose the world trading 
system as a model of social entropy, examining how the law of the World Trade Organization 
(‘WTO’) is failing to counter the entropic tendencies that are beginning to emerge in the 
system of international trade.  Such indicia of disorder consist of the following phenomena:  
the growing inequality observed among and within trading countries; uncertainty in the 
relationship between the law of the WTO and international law and associated problems of 
the interpretation of indeterminate WTO Agreements; the prominence of bilateralism and 
regionalism over multilateralism in international trade law leading to regulatory confusion 
                                               
1
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and incoherence; the lack of effective sanction for breach of WTO Agreements representing a 
lack of institutional authority; and the dispersal of the WTO’s core mandate in regulating 
international trade which has led in part to a rise in global trade protectionism.  
From the outset it must be established that the purpose of this article is not to explore 
specific structural, institutional weaknesses of the WTO, nor to identify theoretical flaws in 
the logic of liberalized trade and comparative advantage.  This article will not attempt to 
propose reforms in world trade governance, either at the WTO or via the increasingly 
numerate Preferential Trading Agreements (PTAs).  These issues have been discussed 
extensively and exhaustively by others.2  This article does not purport to engage 
comprehensively with the foundations of social systems theory, nor will it address any of the 
macro-sociological foundations of social entropy theory, such as systems theory generally or 
the concept of social equilibrium.3   Before embarking upon an analysis of the features of the 
world trading system that conform to a model of social entropy with the WTO as a faltering 
source of ordering energy, it is first necessary to establish that the global community of 
trading states comprising the (near universal) membership of the WTO can itself be described 
as a social system.  
 
 
2. THE WORLD TRADING COMMUNITY AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 
Social entropy theory identifies eight basic levels of living systems: the cell, the organ, the 
organism (individual), group, organization, community, society and the supranational 
system.4  The collective of nations that engage in trade of goods and services with one 
                                               
2
 E.g. Robert Lawrence, “Rulemaking Amidst Growing Diversity: A Club of Clubs Approach to WTO Reform 
and New Issue Selection” 9:4 Journal of International Economic Law 823 (2006) and James Thuo Gathii, 
“Process and Substance in WTO Reform” 56 Rutgers Law Review 885 (2004) 
3
 Kenneth Bailey, ‘Towards a Nonequilibrium Analysis of Complex Social Systems’ 35:1 The British Journal of 
Sociology 1 at 3 (1984) 
4
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another subject to the same rules may be viewed as the final of these categories: a 
supranational system, meaning one with a high level of both economic and regulatory 
integration that extends beyond the sphere of influence of individual nation states.  Indeed 
world trade itself is regularly referred to as a “system” in academic commentary, perhaps 
most notably John Jackson’s treatise on the law of the WTO: The World Trading System.5  
Indeed, the language of “system” is evident in the foundational materials of the WTO.  For 
example, the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO refers to the desire to create a 
more favourable and open “multilateral trading system” for the benefit and welfare of the 
world.6  The community of trading states may be seen as a system in that it contains a number 
of inter-dependent elements, namely national governments, national and international laws 
and a dispute resolution mechanism, each of which is essential to its overall functionality.   
Sociologists have further established that social systems must satisfy a number of 
critical functions in order to slow or halt the increase of entropy.  Each social system 
possesses a set of six characteristics that are crucial to serve this purpose: Population (P), 
Information (I), Level of Living (L), Organization (O), Technology (T) and Space (S).7  Thus 
a plausible application of this metric to the world trading system is as follows.  Population is 
the number of Member states of the WTO which is 157 as of mid-2012.  Alternatively, 
Population could be seen as the aggregate population of all of the Member states of the WTO, 
giving the total number of people who in theory benefit (or suffer) from trading with other 
Member nations. Given that only a few countries remain outside the WTO, this figure would 
effectively cover most of the world’s 7 billion people.  Population is obviously essential for 
the world trading system to function because people both produce and consume traded goods 
and services.  Information is the law of the WTO, meaning its covered multilateral treaties 
                                               
5
 John Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (2nd ed, MIT 
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6
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7
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which contain rules that facilitate the trading of goods and services across international 
borders.  Importantly the Information category should not include bilateral and regional trade 
agreements because these do not govern all of the global population in the system, but rather 
discreet groups within it.  In the system of world trade the Level of Living should be viewed 
as the measureable benefits resulting from liberalized trade as achieved by the law of the 
WTO.  The best method of capturing this variable is GDP per capita, either of the system as a 
whole (all WTO Members) or of each Member State.  Crucially, however, this data does not 
capture the distribution of wealth within the system, which is arguably more indicative of a 
functioning society.  Organization is the WTO itself which fulfils the role as an institution of 
governance in international economic relations.11  It is both a forum for negotiation among 
Members, an authoritative source of trade rules, and a seat of dispute settlement.  Technology 
in the system of world trade consists of the capacity to exchange traded goods and services, 
increasing the number and frequency of transactions.  This is achieved through modern 
telecommunications, most importantly the internet.  Advancement in containerization and the 
automation of sea ports has also improved the capacity of shipping to enlarge international 
trade.  Finally, Space should be seen as the geographic area of the globe that engages in 
world trade either through the production or consumption of traded products and services.  
Given that membership of the WTO now comprises most countries in the world, Space 
therefore consists of most of the economically productive regions of the planet, including its 
land and oceans, without which the production and consumption of traded goods and services 
would be impossible. 
Since the focus of this article is the WTO, the two entropy-resisting functions above 
that will be explored are those that are performed by the WTO, namely Information (law) and 
Organization (the institution of the WTO itself including its dispute settlement mechanism).  
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 E.g. Sol Picciotto who refers to the WTO as a “node of global governance”: Regulating Global Corporate 
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As noted above, all social systems require energy to resist natural decay to entropic 
equilibrium or chaos.  In this regard, law is classic tool by which to counteract social 
entropy.12  In the construction of a social entropy model of world trade, the substantive and 
procedural rules of the WTO are the primary source of law, or energy that acts as a buttress 
against the devolution into disorder.   
Having proposed the world trading system as a social system, this article will now 
outline features of this system which demonstrate a drift towards entropy as a consequence of 
insufficient or ineffective inputs of energy in the form of ordering law from the WTO. 
 
 
3. ENTROPIC TENDENCIES IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 
a) Economic Inequality  
Social inequality is a classic metric of social entropy.14  Indeed economists have used the 
concept of entropy to describe societies in which there is a high level of diversity in terms of 
race, religion and income, particularly where this heterogeneity manifests societal 
dysfunction such as crime, high mortality rates, or inability to achieve self-sufficiency.15 In 
the context of the world trading system it not so much the unequal distribution of wealth but 
rather the randomness of this distribution in the system that is indicative of entropy.  If some 
nations are able to accrue wealth while others lose it, this is should not necessarily be viewed 
as disorder, provided that the allocation is the result of efficiency, namely the comparative 
advantage that one nation has over another one in the production of some good or service, 
                                               
12
 Detlev Vagts and NG Onuf, ‘Book Review: Jurisprudence: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis of Law by 
Anthony D’Amato’ 80 American Journal of International Law 730 at 732 (1986)  
14
 Kenneth Bailey, Social Entropy Theory chapter 8. 
15
 Robert J Oxby, ‘Cognitive Dissonance, Status and Growth of the Underclass’ 114: 498 The Economic Journal 
727 at 744 (1994) and Howard Odum, ‘Folk Sociology as a Subject Field for the Historical Study of Total 
Human Society and the Empirical Study of Group Behavior’ 31:3 Social Forces 193 at 213 (1953) 
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even if this is based upon natural resource endowments.  This process underlies the purpose 
of the WTO and trade liberalization in general.16 
The Gini Index, which measures the degree of inequality in income for a given 
geographic region, demonstrates the movement towards entropy in the world trading system.  
Worldwide, Gini Indices have been increasing steadily since the latter part of the 20th Century 
even as GDPs per capita have grown.  This may be due to a number of factors, including 
population increases without corresponding improvements in technology, such as sanitation 
and agricultural yield.17 Rising global income inequality appears to be contemporaneous with 
the implementation of liberalized trading rules under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (‘GATT’) and the WTO, although this is not to say that a correlation between the two 
must be inferred.  The observed trend of growing inequality in wealth distribution must be 
viewed in the context of the overall increase in international trade that has been observed 
over the period of implementation of the GATT and the WTO agreements. While there was a 
modest decline during the recent global recession, the volume of traded goods and services 
has continued to rise steadily each year.20 While trade has increased, the wealth generated by 
this process has not been enjoyed equally across the community of the world trading system. 
It should be noted that the role played by the WTO in increasing world trade has not 
been firmly established.  According to some economists, the impact of the WTO and the 
GATT before it on international trade has been minimal if not negative in terms of increasing 
international trade flows.  One study concluded that countries belonging to the GATT/WTO 
do not have significantly different levels of trade from non-members.22  More significantly, 
                                               
16
 See e.g. Peter Van Den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization (2nd ed, Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) at 15-24 
17
 Evan Hillebrand, “Poverty, Growth and Inequality Over the Next 50 Years” Food and Agriculture Association 
of the United Nations: Economic and Social Development Department at 7 
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/012/ak968e/ak968e00.pdf> (last accessed Oct 2012) 
20
 Source: UNCTAD Stat, Exports and Imports of Goods and Services, annual, 1980-2011 
<http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=25116> (last accessed September 2012).  
Volume for this measure dropped in 2009 and 2010 but had recovered by 2011. 
22
 Adam Rose, “Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade” (NBER Working Paper No. 9273, 2004) 
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recent studies have demonstrated that while the WTO has a significant positive effect on 
trade, this effect is uneven.  Large industrialized nations have enjoyed increases in trade upon 
joining the WTO, whereas developing countries have in many cases seen their levels of trade 
decline.23  This outcome would be perhaps less troubling were it the not at least partially the 
result of selective liberalization under WTO rules such as the elimination of trade barriers in 
manufacturing but not in agriculture and textiles.24    
The increasing imbalance of wealth among trading nations is an expression of the 
WTO’s failure to re-adjust income inequalities both within individual societies (nations) as 
well as among societies (WTO Members).  This is not to suggest that the WTO has fostered a 
form of economic globalization in which developed countries have prospered at the expense 
of the developing ones, nor is it to posit that an ordered state of the world trading system is 
one in which the entire global economic system is re-oriented towards a development 
purpose. However, a more balanced regime of trade liberalization that is responsive to the 
economic needs and developmental status of each Member state may yield greater results in 
terms of economic growth in poorer states.25 This could be achieved, for example, by scaling 
each Member’s individual concessions according to their economic strength.26  Such an 
approach would be in keeping with the WTO’s mandate of raising the standards of living 
worldwide27 suppressing the disorder of all of the population of the social system through a 
more equitable distribution of the world’s wealth.   
 
b) Impasse in Doha Round Negotiations 
                                               
23
 A Subramanian and S Wei, “The WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly But Unevenly” 72 Journal of International 
Economics 151 (2007) 
24
 Michael Trebilcock, Understanding Trade Law (Edward Elgar, 2011) at 178-184 
25
 Capital controls may also be required to cultivate economic growth in developed countries: see e.g. Joseph 
Stiglitz, “Capital Market Liberalization and Exchange Rate Regimes: Risk Without Reward” 2002 Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 579 at 219. 
26
 Sonia E Rolland, Development at the WTO at 298-303 
27
 Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (15 April 1994) 
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The capacity of a social system to control levels of conflict among its population is indicative 
of its resistance to entropy.28 Disharmony within a social system may be equated with 
growing disorder because the lack of consensus frustrates the society’s ability to effectuate 
change that serves its collective best interests, or at least the best interests of the majority.  
Energy is lost in conflict that could be put towards better uses, such as increased productivity.  
On the other hand, some sociologists point out that it is consensus, rather than discord, which 
characterizes social entropy.  Under this interpretation, the process of contestation is itself the 
emancipator from chaos.29 This is because without the benefit of constant debate and dissent, 
societal progress would become paralyzed, effectively the social entropy of sclerotic 
unanimity, even if it manifests itself in harmony.30 The need for contestation may explain the 
dominance of democracy as among the most effective forms of governance in most modern 
societies.31 
 From the perspective of the order-imposing legal framework of the WTO, consensus 
or near consensus among the Ministerial Conference and the WTO General Council is vital to 
facilitate the proper functioning and advancement of the world trading system. By default 
decisions at the WTO are made by consensus – a decision will be made if no member present 
formally objects.32  Only if no consensus can be reached is a decision submitted to the 
member’s vote, with a majority of votes cast generally sufficing to adopt a decision that will 
bind all members.  Under the single undertaking approach to tariff reductions, nothing is 
agreed upon until all members agree to all aspects the negotiations, which results in a single 
package of multilateral commitments.  Regular negotiation must occur among all WTO 
                                               
28
 Kenneth Cloke, ‘Journeys Into the Heart of Conflict’ 4 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 219 at 
234(2004) 
29
 Mas’ud Zavarzadeh, ‘Pun(k) Deconstruction and the Postmodern Political Imaginary’ 22 Cultural Critique 5 
at 16 (1992) 
30
 Dietrich Schwanitz, ‘Systems Theory According to Niklas Lumann: Its Environment and Conceptual 
Strategies’ 30 Cultural Critique 137 at 152 (1995) 
31
 See e.g. Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries 
(2nd edition, Melior, 2012) and the discussion of “consensus democracies”. 
32
 Art IX:1 of the WTO Agreement 
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Members in order for tariffs to be lowered and new liberalization commitments to be made. 
This is the cornerstone of the WTO’s function as a forum of multilateral engagement in the 
sphere of international trade. 
The failure of the current round of negotiations to make significant progress towards deeper 
liberalization demonstrates that the WTO as a consensus building forum is not fulfilling its 
role in resisting entropy.  In this context entropy may be seen as the failure to achieve greater 
levels of international trade among WTO Members, as well as the recent observed rise in 
protectionism.33  While it is not the place to discuss the problems of ongoing trade 
negotiation comprehensively here, the Doha Round of multilateral negotiations, which began 
in November 2001, remains stalled because of several key issues.  These include agricultural 
subsidies, non-agricultural market access, and further liberalization of services through 
GATS specific commitments, as well as rules on anti-dumping, subsidies and countervailing 
duties. 34  The requirement of consensus decision-making among all 157 WTO Members, as 
well as the format of the single undertaking render the conclusion of a trade round with 
meaningful results on these issues almost impossible.  In social systems terms, the Population 
parameter has become too large for the Organization function to administer.  This represents 
an institutional deficiency in the WTO as the instrument of delivery of the balancing energy 
of international trade rules to its Members.  A shift towards plurilateralism, wherein WTO 
Members choose the agreements to which they wish to be bound, as for example with the 
Agreement on Government Procurement, may resolve the difficulty with the all-or-nothing 
approach of multilateralism and help achieve liberalization at more measured pace over time. 
 
                                               
33
 Pascal Lamy, Speech to the Thai Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, 30 May 2012 
<http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl232_e.htm> (last accessed November 2012).  See also 
European Commission Directorate-General For Trade, Ninth Report on Potentially Trade Restrictive Measures, 
September 2011 – May 2012, The European Commission, 6 June 2012. This study acknowledges the major role 
of the global financial crisis in causing protection. 
34
 Michael Trebilcock, Understanding Trade Law (Edward Elgar, 2011) at 104-105 
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c) Interpretive Confusion and Weak Dispute Settlement   
The prevalence of disputes regarding legal entitlements has been identified as a key 
contributor to social entropy.38  Just as in science entropy is viewed as measurement of the 
loss of energy due to random motion, in the social context it is a measurement of the loss of 
the capacity to detect and prevent destructive conflicts before they occur.  Conflict resolution 
mechanisms protect societies against social entropy by dissipating the wasteful energy of 
disputes into higher levels of unity and cohesiveness.  In this way, conflict resolution serves 
social systems by allowing them to adapt to changes in their environment and reach higher 
levels of development.39 A properly functioning legal system may not only resolve disputes 
that bring about disorder, it may actually re-adjust relationships to a higher level of order than 
before the conflict arose.  In the words of one commentator: “conflict resolution techniques 
can thus be considered a hedge against social entropy, and a method for translating the chaos 
of conflict into social evolution.”40 A given legal system may achieve this goal by the 
refinement of its own procedures as well as the content and meaning of its rules, bringing 
clarity and therefore predictability to the laws governing relationships between parties within 
the social system.  However, because resolution is a more highly ordered state than conflict, it 
requires energy to create and maintain.  Thus, entropy predicts that without any additional 
effort, it will be easier for resolution to break down and result in conflict, than for conflict to 
break down and result in resolution.41 
                                               
38
 D.C. Wadhwa, ‘Guaranteeing Title to Land’ 37:47 Economic and Political Weekly 4699 at 4721 (2002) 
(referring specifically to registration of title to land)  
39
 Kenneth Cloke, ‘Journeys Into the Heart of Conflict’ 4 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 219 at 
234(2004) 
40
 Kenneth Cloke, ‘Journeys Into the Heart of Conflict’ 4 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 219 at 
233(2004) 
41
 Kenneth Cloke, ‘Journeys Into the Heart of Conflict’ 4 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 219 at 
233(2004)  
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 In the context of the world trading system, conflict resolution is achieved through 
application of the substantive laws contained in the WTO Agreements to disputes between 
Member states by the WTO Panels and Appellate Body, as specified by the procedural rules 
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.  While Panels and Appellate Body reports are not 
binding precedents they provide clarification regarding the meaning of the WTO agreements 
in order to preserve the rights and obligations of Members.42 This is a critical means of 
strengthening the multilateral trading system because it helps ensure predictability, allowing 
for trading parties to organize their activities with the confidence that their legal entitlements 
will be observed.43 The process of contestation of legal entitlements may itself be viewed as a 
vital component of a functioning society.44 Indeed the judicialization of the world trading 
system through the WTO dispute settlement system should be viewed as achievement 
because it has contributed to the de-politicization of trade disputes, preventing the escalation 
of trade barriers to armed conflict while preserving diplomatic relations between states.46    
However, in fulfilling this function neither the Panels nor the Appellate Body  have 
been able to offer a clear picture of the interpretive principles that should resolve inherent 
uncertainties in the language of the treaties and in that sense the integrity of the conflict 
resolution system of the world trading system has been compromised.47   In addition to the 
ambiguity of trade-specific concepts such as “likeness” for the purposes of Most Favoured 
Nation48 and National Treatment49 analysis and the prohibition of measures that are a 
“disguised restriction on international trade” for the purposes of General Exceptions to the 
                                               
42
 Dispute Settlement Understanding Art 3.2 
43
 Art 23 
44
 Mas’ud Zavarzadeh, ‘Pun(k) Deconstruction and the Postmodern Political Imaginary’ 22 Cultural Critique 5 
at 16 (1992) 
46
 John Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) at 147.  
47
 See e.g. Andrew Mitchell, Legal Principles in WTO Disputes (Cambridge, 2008) 
48
 Art I:1, as examined for example in Spain-Unroasted Coffee, Panel Report [4.6] – [4.9] 
49
 Art III:2, as examined for example in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, Appellate Body Report at 114 
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GATT50, tests involving proportionality, necessity and balancing are also not clearly 
delineated in WTO law.  These latter more general concepts are crucial to the interpretation 
of the GATT, the GATS as well as the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS Agreement) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement).51  
The manner in which these vital tools of conflict resolution are applied by WTO tribunals is 
often rooted in competing values and interests, such as economic efficiency, health or 
sustainable development.  But although this exercise accords a degree of flexibility and 
dynamism to the dispute settlement system, the lack of a more coherent conceptual 
framework for applying these principles threatens the conflict resolution procedure’s stability 
and predictability.  Given the absence of specific rules on numerous sensitive issues and the 
centrality of the dispute settlement process in forming WTO law the importance of 
interpretive principles can only increase in the future.52   
Furthermore, the critical relationship between WTO law and international law 
remains complex and controversial.  The extent to which WTO panels and the Appellate 
Body take into account non-WTO law is uncertain, exacerbating interpretive conflicts 
resulting from the ambiguity of treaty texts and unsettling the system’s capacity for conflict 
resolution.  While the law of the WTO may be considered lex specialis in that WTO 
Members agree to suspend the application of certain rules of international law when they 
accede to the WTO’s single undertaking, it is still very much part of the wider system of 
public international law.53  Accordingly the Panels and Appellate Body consider other 
international commitments undertaken by Members following the interpretive principles of 
                                               
50
 Art XX, as examined for example in US-Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, at 20-21 
51
 GATT Art XX, GATS Art XIV, SPS Art 5, TBT Art 2 
52
 See e.g. Mads Andenas and  Stefan Zleptnig, “Proportionality in WTO Law: In Comparative Perspective” 42 
Texas International Law Journal 371 (2007) at 377-378 
53
 Joost Pauwelyn,  ‘The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?’95 American 
Journal of International Law 535 (2001) 
  
14 
 
customary international law as expressed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.55  
Yet precisely how and when this should be done remains a source of confusion for the panels 
and Appellate Body as well as much debate within the academic community.57  In particular 
commentators have argued that there has been excessive reliance on dictionary definitions to 
establish the “ordinary meaning” of terms, a technique that hides prior interpretive choices by 
the editors of dictionaries.58 Commentators have cautioned that there has been a degree of 
openness to interpret WTO agreements via non-WTO law, such as other international treaties 
and decisions of international courts, even where the basis for doing so under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties is not obvious.59 The lack of coherence in the process of 
application of norms derived from other sources of international law to world trade law has 
contributed to the organization’s “legitimacy crisis” undermining its role as an authoritative 
locus of world economic governance.61  The problem of legal indeterminacy may be in part 
the consequence of the fact that the drafters of the Dispute Settlement Understanding did not 
intend to endow the WTO’s dispute settlement system with such reach.  
 Another strong indication of disorder within the WTO’s dispute settlement system is 
its incapacity to deal with complaints brought by smaller private parties who typically seek 
monetary damages against states.  As suggested above the Population of the world trading 
                                               
55
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Arts 31 and 32, 8 ILM (1969) 679, as referenced in the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding Art 3.2, US-Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted 20 May 
1996) at 16; US-Shrimp, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted 6 November 1998);; and  European 
Communities – Biotech Products, Panel Reports, United States (WT/DS291/R), Canada (WT/DS292/R), and 
Argentina (WT/DS293/R) (adopted 29 September 2006) 
57
 See e.g. Gabrielle Marceau, “Conflicts of Norms of Jurisdictions: The Relationship between the WTO 
Agreement and MEAs and Other Treaties” (2001) 35 Journal of World Trade 1081 and Joost Pauwelyn, 
Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law 
(2003) 
58
 Andrew Mitchell, at 78 referring to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention.  But see EC-Biotech in which the 
Panel stated that rules of international law may themselves provide evidence of the ordinary meaning of terms 
like dictionaries do, at [7.92] 
59
 Isabelle Van Damme, “What Role is there for Regional International Law in the Interpretation of the 
WTO Agreements?” in Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino, eds, Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO 
Legal System (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 553 at 575. For example the Appellate Body has cited 
a decision of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID): US – Stainless Steel, 
Appellate Body Report,WT/DS344/AB/R, n. 313, (adopted 20 May 2008) 
61
 Andrew Michell, Legal Principles in WTO Disputes (Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 267; Andrew 
Lang, World Trade Law After Neoliberalism (Oxford University Press, 2011) at 313-317.  
  
15 
 
system may be viewed as all of the trading parties within the WTO Member states, not 
simply the states themselves. The WTO’s failure to address this key manifestation economic 
conflict has undermined its role as a forum for the settlement of international disputes and has 
contributed to the appearance of trade-oriented disputes disguised as investor-state disputes 
under bilateral investment treaties.64  The state-to-state nature of WTO dispute settlement 
system is best suited to the needs of large or well organized suppliers who are able to 
effectively lobby their governments to bring claims on their behalf, leaving smaller suppliers 
often without representation.65 This procedure is even less inclusive today given the modern 
tendency of international business to be conducted by smaller entities which are able to serve 
more disparate markets because of the global penetration of the internet and other 
technological advancements.66  Private parties suffering from unlawful trade barriers will be 
achieve inadequate redress in the event that a measure adversely affecting their activities is 
deemed to be WTO-inconsistent by the Dispute Settlement Body because the WTO does not 
provide monetary damages under its  forward-looking remedial structure.68 Thus the dispute 
settlement system does not truly compensate injured businesses, the Population of the world 
trading system, for who the removal of the WTO-incompatible law has limited practical 
utility, especially in the short term. 
 
d) The Rise of Bilateralism and Regionalism 
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Social entropy has been defined as the in-built tendency of any mass organization to be 
dominated by local groups rather than by any central leadership with more general and long-
term goals.69 The clear analogy in the context of the world trading system is the 
decentralization of the law governing trade, namely the WTO, from the global to the regional 
or bilateral.  According to social entropy theory any energy that is not present in the system 
that offsets the drift towards disorder must be imported from outside the system.71 Since law 
is a form of energy in society that counteracts degradation towards chaos, PTAs could 
therefore be said to address a gap in world trade law, namely a deficiency in the WTO to 
fulfil its role in governing the trading relations among its Members. World trade law is 
therefore being displaced by international trade law as the primary means by which the social 
system of world trade repels entropy, or the lawlessness of trading relations (effectively 
unilateralism).  Social entropy theory further states that exogenous, disaggregated sources of 
energy, while countering entropic effects, may themselves unsettle the society into which it is 
brought.73   Applying this model, a number of commentators have observed that the 
congruence of PTAs with the WTO’s multilateral system is believed to constitute one of the 
most significant and enduring challenges to the world trading system in the coming years.74 
Most problematically, the preference for bilateral and regional trade law as opposed to that 
promulgated by a central authority can undermine the economic efficiency that should accrue 
from global trade liberalization. 
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Almost 500 preferential trade agreements have been notified to the GATT/WTO, 
including more than 350 since 1990.75 There is extensive academic literature on the growth of 
PTAs and their primarily adverse effect on world trade.76  Generally PTAs have been  
criticized by commentators, most notably for their contribution to a highly complex, often 
confusing assortment of rules which raises compliance costs, as well as the resulting trade 
diversion, meaning that inefficient suppliers from within PTAs will be chosen to source 
goods and services rather than more efficient suppliers from outside.77 To the extent that 
bilateralism preferences non-competitive suppliers over competitive ones, it operates as a 
market distortion, facilitating the wasteful provision of traded goods which acts as a loss to 
social welfare.  Bilateralism can therefore be seen to add to the entropy of the world trading 
system. 
 From a standpoint of consistency with the global trade framework of the WTO, the 
adaptability of bilateral rules to the WTO framework is both poorly articulated and 
ineffectively enforced.  Under the GATT, the internal requirement for a PTA specifies that 
duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce be eliminated with respect to 
“substantially all the trade” between constituent countries.78  However the legal meaning of 
“substantially all the trade” has never been clearly established and remains highly contested.  
Furthermore, the external requirement requires that duties and other regulations of commerce 
on third parties should not be higher or more restrictive after the creation of the PTA than 
before.79  For customs unions, which entail the creation of a common external tariff, duties or 
other regulations of commerce must not be higher or more restrictive “on the whole” after the 
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creation of a PTA than before, a phrase which has also yet to be elucidated clearly. While the 
capacity for compliance with GATT PTA rules is to be assessed judicially by the Panels and 
Appellate Body, no complaints have been brought by WTO Members on the basis of a PTA’s 
non-compliance with GATT, suggesting a reluctance of Members to challenge these 
arrangements because of the uncertainty in the laws that govern them. Clearly the vagueness 
of the language in the GATT and the methodology for reviewing compliance of PTAs within 
the WTO is legally ambiguous as well as potentially economically harmful, emphasizing the 
disordering effect of their contribution to the decentralization of world trade law. 
 
e) The Problem of Enforcement of WTO Law 
Social entropy may be characterized by “the amount of socially un-patterned behaviour to be 
permitted” within the understanding of public order in the community.  The greater the 
quantity or degree of such behaviour that is permitted to occur, the less ordered that society is 
seen to be.90  Thus under a social entropy model of world trade law, increasing entropy may 
be characterized both by the behaviour of WTO Members that breach WTO law and yet 
suffer inadequate sanction as a consequence and by the unilateral retaliation by affected 
Members against the breach of others as opposed to the authorized suspension of 
concessions.   
WTO Members agree to use the Dispute Settlement System as the exclusive remedy 
for all violations of WTO91, meaning that they effectively “contract-out” of conventional 
public international law remedies, such as full reparation.92 In many respects this restricts a 
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Member’s capacity to achieve full redress for wrongs that it has suffered as a result of a WTO 
treaty breach by another state, as noted above in relation to the lack of monetary damages. 
This is therefore a significant concession required as a consequence of membership in the 
WTO community.  Under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, if a Member fails to 
comply with a final ruling in a dispute, the winning party may retaliate by suspending trade 
concessions that it owes the offending member.93  This retaliation can continue until the 
offending member implements the Panel or Appellate Body report as adopted by the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body by bringing its laws into conformity with its WTO obligations, after 
a reasonable period of time for compliance.  Yet some commentators have argued that the 
retaliation remedy is too weak and unpredictable to be effective, particularly in asymmetric 
disputes between large and small economies.  If an economically weak country suspends 
concessions against another country, it may simply harm its own economy, most notably its 
consumers, by restricting key imports.  Suspending trade concessions also hurts innocent 
firms that find their products subject to higher tariffs.94  Clearly retaliation may also reinforce 
income disparities between large and small countries and in that sense it exacerbates 
inequality within the world trading system.   
 Retaliation is itself a form of trade protectionism in that it constitutes derogation from 
negotiated trade commitments.   Such “vigilante justice” is particularly noted in the context 
of anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties in response to subsidization.  One study has 
shown that WTO Members that have the capacity to initiate meaningful (harmful) retaliation 
against a Member that is in breach of WTO anti-dumping or subsidies rules will tend to do so 
instead of pursuing a multilateral remedy through the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. This is 
because a unilateral retaliation tends to achieve greater results in terms of economic benefits 
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to the injured country at lesser expense.95  Likewise, the observance of self-defence training 
and the purchase of weapons as an alternative to law enforcement through police departments 
is considered to be symptomatic of social entropy.96 Citizens must seek their own remedies 
where the state fails to provide this for them.   
Even in instances where the multilateral dispute settlement system is used by 
Members, the record of compliance with WTO dispute settlement body recommendations is 
far from perfect, with a third of disputes resulting in non-compliance to some degree.97 
Imperfect compliance may be inescapable given the different competing and highly 
politically fluid interests of all WTO Members.98  It may also be the consequence of the 
world trading system lacking a meaningful enforcement mechanism other than reputational 
sanction and ineffectual countermeasures. While the value of reputation-based compliance is 
viewed by some as significant, it is difficult to empirically assess the extent to which 
reputational sanction motivates Members to comply with WTO rulings.99 Clearly non-
compliance conveys a lack of respect for the rules of the WTO, an indication of disorder 
within the world trading system. 
 
f) Lack of Institutional Focus or “Mission Creep”  
Sociologists have argued that an economy that is not based primarily upon market exchanges 
but is instead characterized by redundant institutional or bureaucratic elements is indicative 
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of growing social entropy.100  Given that Organizations are critical for the channelling of 
sustaining energy within a social system (recall the O in the six functions of a social system), 
this view of entropy appears to contemplate administrative structures that have become over-
large relative to their purpose as facilitators of energy-producing economic activity through 
the promulgation of laws (such those relating to property or contractual rights).  Sociologists 
further claim that change within an institution often requires an attendant increase in social 
entropy.101 Thus as a given institution adapts to fit a new economic or social environment, 
perhaps by expanding to take on new tasks as a consequence of population growth or 
technological progress, the process of adaptation itself is unsettling to the social system. 
Applying this model to the world trading system, social entropy in the form of an 
observed increase in global trade protectionism102 may be in part the result of WTO’s lack of 
focus on its primary mandate to minimize barriers to market exchanges.  Obfuscation of 
institutional purpose at the WTO has occurred because WTO Members continue to add new 
issues and table proposals in relation to investment, competition and government 
procurement, with numerous working groups established to consider and debate the further 
extension of the WTO’s ambit.103  Some commentators urge that even extending the original 
GATT to cover spheres of activity such as intellectual property, health protection, and 
services was inappropriate given the language and context of trade bargaining that had begun 
under the GATT.  They claim that this enlargement resulted in the marginalization of other 
the international organizations that had direct responsibility over the issues in question, such 
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as the World Intellectual Property Organization, as well as specific services industry 
regulators, like the International Telecommunications Union.104  In this regard, the WTO’s 
attempt to liberalize trade in services through the GATS is a questionable extension of its 
initial mandate contained in the GATT to liberalize trade in goods.  Indeed the regulation of 
trade in services has been problematic from the standpoint of national autonomy because the 
barriers to trade in services are not border measures such as tariffs or quotas, but internal 
domestic regulations often associated with maintaining complete delivery and level of quality 
in various specific sectors.  Negotiations for greater liberalization under the GATS, often 
involving many layers of government are very resource and time intensive and to date have 
done little more than capture the status-quo.105 
Cooperation between the WTO and other international organizations critical to the 
delivery of its primary function of liberalizing trade has been slow to develop.  Among the 
most obvious most obvious failures in this regard is the ongoing dilemma of competitive 
currency devaluation, as generally prohibited by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).   
The WTO’s inadequate response to strategic currency devaluation has rendered its 
achievements in the sphere of trade liberalization in many ways illusory.  Although the IMF’s 
currency devaluation rules are reinforced by provisions in the GATT109, the WTO has failed 
to treat these as anti-trade manoeuvres capable of sanction by the Panels and Appellate Body. 
Rather, the WTO has constrained individual countries’ capacity to respond to currency 
appreciation directly by providing relief through harmful protectionist measures such as 
quotas and tariffs.  This failing of the WTO is particularly acute because the WTO is a more 
suitable forum for the enforcement of currency manipulation than the IMF, which lacks a 
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judicial mechanism for the resolution of disputes between member countries.110  WTO 
Members’ need to respond to competitive currency devaluation has led to greater filing of 
claims through WTO dispute settlement on the basis of other breaches of WTO law during 
periods of currency appreciation because there is no other tool, at the WTO or elsewhere, 
available to countries that have been injured by competitive currency policy of their trading 
partners.111  The result is confusing, unpredictable and ineffective and undermines the WTO’s 
capacity to fulfil its mandate of the efficient functioning of the world trading system. 
A plausible explanation for the WTO’s shortcomings in its institutional focus might 
be its lack of sufficient resources.  The WTO could be viewed as insufficiently institutionally 
robust as an organization, rather than overly so, as traditionally social entropy analysis would 
suggest of an organization within a social system.112  Despite its evident mission creep noted 
above, the WTO is comparatively under-resourced as an international organization given its 
importance in the global economy.  The WTO’s annual budget in 2012 was just over 196 
million Swiss Francs (USD 208 million)  compared to almost USD 1 billion for the IMF and 
almost USD 2 billion for the World Bank.  This deficiency is perhaps the most directly 
analogous feature of the WTO to the theory social entropy.  Without sufficient funding the 
role of the WTO in delivering Information and maintaining Organization cannot be 
adequately performed and there will consequently be insufficient “energy” for the social 
system to resist disorder.    
 
 
3. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF SOCIAL ENTROPY AND THE WTO 
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Entropy should not be viewed as necessarily destructive to an organization or society.  Indeed 
commentators have argued that an ideal society should have a “systemic randomness.”113  
Such a dis-ordering of society was anticipated, and not without a degree of hopeful promise, 
by sociologists even before the internet age as a consequence of the erosion of social ties, 
heightened personal mobility and advanced modes of communication leading to the effective 
elimination of space.114  In many ways this type of society is associated with globalization 
and the increasing inter-relatedness of people, countries and organizations.  Thus, rather than 
castigating the WTO for its failures the WTO could be praised for its contribution to entropy 
in its elimination of the regulations that undermined economically efficient global trade 
flows.  In a social entropy model protectionist trade policies, such as those associated with 
the period before the implementation of the GATT, could be viewed as high-energy inputs 
into the world trading system that ordered trade relation along the lines of a mercantilist, 
isolationist economic policy in a manner that was ultimately damaging.  In this model 
entropy is positive because it represents a break down in trade barriers, leading to the 
comparative chaos of “free” trade.  The underlying order in this model therefore becomes the 
comparative advantage of the state which supplies the traded commodity. 
The evidence of this disordering effect of the WTO may be seen in the degree of 
openness of WTO Members to international trade as a consequence of the elimination of 
superfluous or ineffective legal or bureaucratic impediments. The OECD FDI Regulatory 
Restrictiveness Index which measures legal barriers to foreign direct investment (‘FDI’) 
reveals that there has been a gradual reduction in trade law restrictiveness worldwide over 
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time.115  While the Index does not explicitly acknowledge the contribution of the WTO, 
which of course has the primary mandate of liberalizing trade not investment, it is not 
difficult to infer the correlation between the WTO’s emphasis on transparency and non-
discrimination and the increase in flow of foreign investment, especially in countries such as 
China and Russia, which joined the WTO in 2001 and 2012 respectively.  Likewise, the 
International Chamber of Commerce’s Open Markets Index considers the lack of domestic 
protectionist trade policies in establishing a metric for each country’s capacity to encourage 
international trade.116 The World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index, which considers the 
extent to which each country in the world is free from corruption as well transparent and 
effective in the promulgation and enforcement of its laws in business as well as other 
spheres117, similarly owes some of the observed progress to the emphasis on rules-based 
governance associated with WTO Membership.  The World Bank’s Doing Business Report, 
which outlines the impact of domestic laws of countries around the world positively or 
negatively on commercial activities, including the extent to which the legal environment is 
un-necessarily complicated, has demonstrated a number of positive reforms in this area, 
especially in low income countries.118  The WTO is not credited directly for such advances in 
the Doing Business Report however the need for WTO Member states to maintain open, 
predictable regulatory environments that are conducive to foreign trade as well as investment 
embodies many of the key provisions in the GATT and the GATS among other agreements.  
Lastly, the Global Competitiveness Report evaluates the economic productivity of individual 
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countries based on various factors including the absence of over-regulation and red-tape119, 
characteristics that can be attributed to the WTO’s approach to streamlining domestic 
regulations that impact upon international trade.  The WTO has undoubtedly been 
instrumental in reducing the number and complexity of domestic laws that affect international 
trade and in so doing assisting Member countries in improving their rankings in the above 
indicia.   
Although in the absence of the WTO’s multilateral rules protectionist trade laws are 
detrimental to international trade flows and ultimately socially destructive in their raising of 
living costs and lowering of incomes worldwide, these laws could equally be seen as 
bulwarks against the comparative entropy of free trade.  Under this model, a global system of 
liberalized trade in which comparative advantage resulting variously from skills, population 
or resource endowments dictates the patterns of production and exchange of traded 
commodities could be viewed as disordered because it is not predicated upon government-
imposed barriers.  In the absence of protectionism, trading patterns are not strictly speaking 
random, as social entropy would conventionally demand, yet they are natural in the sense that 
they are not dependent upon energy in the form of laws.121 If de-regulation, or more precisely 
liberalization, is lawlessness, the ensuing economic relations may not be truly disordered or 
arbitrary but rather rooted in market-oriented exchanges. In this particular social entropy 
model of the world trading system the WTO serves a critical function, that of what might be 
described metaphorically as the chaos machine, because it facilitates the regulatory 
“disorder” necessary for the natural state of the world trade system to assert itself.  To the 
extent that this results in rising living standards and real income this actualization of social 
entropy theory should be celebrated. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
This article has proposed world trade law as a model of social entropy in which the 
substantive legal and institutional features of the WTO are depicted as failing to ensure the 
expansion of international trade against the disorder of damaging trade protectionism.  This 
article has supported this claim by postulating a movement towards entropy in international 
trade premised on various indicia of disorder in the world trading system: economic 
inequality instead of equality; legal uncertainty instead of legal certainty; bilateralism instead 
of multilateralism; unilateral retaliation instead of multilateral sanction; and unfocused 
institutional purpose instead of a clear trade-oriented mandate.   
 The social entropy model of the world trading system discussed here has not 
predicted specific future outcomes with respect to levels of global trade or economic growth.  
The original theory of social entropy did not attempt to offer predictions directly, in large part 
because it was removed from practical application.123  Indeed one of the chief criticisms of 
social entropy as an abstract theory is its failure to accommodate actual sociological 
phenomena,124 a weakness that this article has attempted to resolve in part through the 
application to an actual social system.  Following the premise that the WTO can be 
characterized as an agent of entropy, a generalized prediction is therefore that the world 
trading system is heading towards a state of greater disorder in the trading relationship 
between states. This may be marked by an increase in protectionism as well as a growth in 
economic inequality and a decline of world trade.  If the WTO is able to fulfil its central role 
in liberalizing trade, an alternative view of entropy may ensue, one in which trading relations 
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are “free” in as much as they are not based upon rigid trade barriers, and in which the only 
guard against total randomness (the only stable condition of any system) in trading relations 
is comparative advantage, supplemented by efforts to assist in the more equal distribution of 
wealth. 
 Social entropy has been defined as a problem that has defied the best efforts of 
organizational control, meaning ways by which governmental organizations are kept efficient 
and effective in highly complex environments.131 The rule of law may be conceptualized as a 
defence against social entropy in that it restrains the degradation of social order that is 
predicated upon the arbitrary exercise of power.  Thus the WTO, as an instrument of the rule 
of law in world trade helps suppress the drift towards disorder in international economic 
relations.  If the deficiencies in the energy-inputting function of the WTO outlined in this 
article are responsible for the degradation towards entropy, then improvements in the WTO’s 
delivery of its “energy” are essential to maintain order in the world trading system.  This 
article has suggested that the WTO must assert its position as the global authority for the 
regulation of international trade.  It must do so by adopting a trade-specific approach to this 
role with clearer rules, an understanding of the need to distribute wealth more evenly, and to 
offer more effective enforcement. 
 More generally, as a trans-disciplinary study this article has validated the theory of 
social entropy by proposing a verifiable model of a social system that has demonstrated signs 
of predicted decay as a consequence of its own internal insufficiencies.  This article has 
accordingly established that social entropy theory offers a useful lens through which to assess 
the functionality of the “system” of world trade and the WTO in particular.  Social entropy 
theory proposes at an admittedly high level of generality in this particular discussion, that 
effective legal and institutional architecture is critical to the prevention of degradation 
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towards disorder in global trading relations, leading to declining growth and exacerbating 
inequality.  Further studies may demonstrate that such guidance drawn from the field of 
sociology, and indeed the science of thermodynamics, may be fruitfully applied to evaluate 
other supra-national or international organizations, such as European Union or the United 
Nations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
